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Abstract: 
The Belt and Road Initiative is a cross-border economic belt initiated and led by the Chinese gov-
ernment in 2013. Its scope covers the history of the Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road through 
China, Central Asia, North and West Asia, the Indian Ocean coast, the Mediterranean coast coun-
tries and regions. The country and region covered by the initiative are vast, and the impact is 
therefore enormous. This thesis uses geopolitical theory and methods to study the traditional Chi-
nese geopolitical ideology, the development of the initiative, geostrategic attempts, geopolitical 
influences and risks proposed by One Belt and Road Initiative development strategy. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Today, China is the second largest economy and the largest resource and energy importer in the 
international society.1 China has economic and trade relations with more than 200 countries and 
regions which is already the world’s largest trading state and is the largest foreign exchange reserve 
country with approximately US$3.009 trillion (March 2019).2 The rapid development of China is, 
to some extent, changing the global geopolitical landscape. From another perspective, sustainable 
economic development, resource security, and import and export trade are of utmost importance to 
the survival and development of the country. Today’s China also needs to rely on the world to 
develop itself. From the end of Cold War, a super-strong international structure has been relatively 
stable. China wants to break out of the current pattern and must find new breakthroughs that has 
not been completely controlled and a new development path. One Belt and Road Initiatives could 
be seen as a major strategy for China’s internal affairs diplomacy in the coming decades. AIIB, 
BRICS, China-Korea Free Trade Zone, China-Australia Free Trade Zone, China ASEAN Free 
Trade Area, Asia-Pacific Free Trade Zone, RMB cross-border payment system, and overseas RMB 
national debt opening and so on,3 it shows that China is trying to build a new global economic 
structure in a comprehensive and multi-level manner.  Some scholars have pointed out that as China 
becomes stronger and the status of the United States is eroded, China will attempt to use its in-
creasing influence to reshape the rules and systems of the international system to better serve its 
interests.4 
 
The international community also has different voices about the attitude to One Belt and Road 
Initiative. As the world’s largest economy, the United States has different attitudes toward BRI. 
The political circles generally oppose that it is clear from the United States that they do not join 
                                                 
1 This paper only covers facts before its finished date in May 2019. 
2 China Foreign Exchange Reserves, Trading Economic. Available at:  
https://tradingeconomics.com/china/foreign-exchange-reserves  
3 Hu, W. and J. Pelkmans (2017). "China-EU Leadership in Globalisation: Ambition and capacity. CEPS Policy Insight 
No 2017/18, May 2017.":5 
4 Ikenberry, G. J. (2008). "The rise of China and the future of the West-Can the liberal system survive." Foreign Aff. 
87: 23. 
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the AIIB initiated by China and obstruct the participation of allies. From a deeper perspective, the 
United States is worried that the Asian-invested AIIB may impact the existing US-led international 
political and economic system, fearing that the establishment of the AIIB will weaken the role of 
World Bank led by the US and Asian Development Bank led by Japan. However, the views of 
American think tanks are not uniform.  
 
The Brookings Institution researcher David Dollar believes that the establishment of the AIIB can 
make up for the inefficiency of the existing financial mechanisms such as the World Bank, slow 
reforms and neglect of infrastructure construction, which can complement the US-backed Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). US officials are skeptical about the transparency of AIIB, 
and China may use this mechanism to achieve its other political and economic goals.5 Another 
researcher of the Brookings Institution, Sun Yun, takes China-Africa cooperation as an example. 
He believes that the accomplishing of the Belt and Road Initiative cannot solve the existing prob-
lems. The purpose of China is to obtain more resources, which may aggravate the deterioration of 
the environment in Africa.6 This view also analyzes from a certain extent the United States has 
reservations about BRI. 
 
1.2 Research Challenges 
The biggest problem I encountered in my research was to overcome the ideology and knowledge 
system that I had originally accepted. The Chinese literature that was exposed in the previous 
education and learning process has obvious bias in the political and social fields. In the course of 
my own research, there is an inevitable need to read a large amount of Chinese literature to under-
stand the Chinese academic circles’ opinions on One Belt and Road Initiative. But most of these 
documents have obvious ideological positions, and how to overcome this impact in research is the 
biggest challenge for me. 
                                                 
5 David Dollar: Lessons for the AIIB from the experience of the World Bank, April,27,2015. 
https://wwwbrookings.edu/articles/china-on-the-global-stage/ 
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On the other hand, geopolitics is a very old subject, and it has also developed different develop-
ment contexts in the different historical backgrounds of China and the West. In my research, I tried 
to distinguish between two different geopolitical theoretical development systems, which required 
a large number of historical facts to be demonstrated. Therefore, the timeline for my research needs 
to be traced very long, and I need to read a lot of literature to enrich my argument. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
My research questions mainly include these three issues. The first question is why does China 
propose One Belt and Road Initiative and what is his intention and interest trend? 
 
The second issue is what are the adverse effects of China’s One Belt and Road Initiative? 
 
1.4 Structure of the Paper 
After the introduction chapter, the second chapter is the methodology. In this chapter I will detail 
all the methodologies I have used in this study and explain why I chose them. In the third chapter, 
I will analyze the background and conditions of the traditional Western classical geopolitical the-
ory, and compare it with the traditional Chinese geopolitical thinking, so as to analyze the histori-
cal origins and specific conditions proposed by the China One Belt and Road Initiative. In the 
fourth chapter, I detailed the process of the Belt and Road advancement and some achievements. 
In the fifth chapter, I analyzed the motives and intentions behind BRI from four perspectives. In 
sixth chapter, I discussed the adverse effects and risks in BRI. Finally, the seventh chapter is a 
summary section. I will summarize my research results and propose possible research directions 
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Chapter 2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Documentary Analysis 
Because I come from China, I can read and understand all the Chinese materials. I will read and 
summarize China’s geopolitical concepts since ancient times, including historical books and biog-
raphy of the art of war. I will also read western geo- logic writings and compare them with China’s 
geo-concepts. And through systematic classification, research, and analysis of relevant classics, 
essays, and dissertations appearing in the history of the development of geopolitical thoughts both 
in China and the West, in order to further analyze China’s geostrategies, approaches and objectives.   
 
2.2 Comparative Analysis 
I will compare Chinese traditional geopolitical thinking with Western classic geopolitical theory, 
which conclude that the initiative of One Belt and Road Initiative is more influenced by Chinese 
traditional geography. Therefore, each geostrategic proposal is influenced by the background of 
the times, social conditions, state power and interests. The traditional Chinese culture and thoughts 
have been inherited ever since, and they have a guiding role in various Chinese policies. 
 
2.3 Systematic Analysis Method 
Systematic analysis is an important research method used in this paper. First of all, in the context 
of rise of China, China’s global geopolitical strategy as a whole system, including geopolitical 
security strategy, geo-economic strategy, geo-technical strategy and other subsystems within this 
large system. These subsystems coordinate and interact with each other to form a complete picture 
of China’s global geostrategy.  
 
2.4 Geostrategic Research Method 
Geo-strategy, as an important pillar of theoretical and realist international relations theory, is based 
on specific methodological research. From the beginning of geopolitical theory, it has experienced 
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the evolution of geography determinism, space-power analysis and structuralist methodology, but 
the pursuit of its substantive research methods is the relationship between the human environment 
and the geographical location of the country. influences. As a powerful land-power state in the 
eastern part of Eurasia and a sea-power country on the west coast of the Pacific Ocean, China 
could be regarded as a typical land-sea complex country. One Belt and Road Initiatives is based 
on the development reality of China’s current era, the geographical location combined with land 
and sea, and historical background. Starting from the geopolitical theory, the article explores the 
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Chapter 3. Geo-political Theory 
 
3.1 Relevant Concepts and Introduction 
Geopolitics: Geopolitics is based on two disciplines: political science and geography. ` From the 
etymological derivation, the term “geopolitics” refers to the study of the effects of geography (es-
pecially economic geography) on international politics7, but its meaning is far more than that. Be-
cause of the limitations of the times and the needs of international interests, scholars of different 
times and countries have given it different meanings. Inspired by German geographer Friedrich 
Ratzel, Rudolph Kjellén, a Swedish political scientist, first defined “geopolitics” in 1899 as the 
theory of the state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in space.8 Later, Nicholas Spykman 
put forward that one of the meanings of geopolitics, that is, be regarded as a synonym of political 
geography, so that it became a branch of geography, describing the structure of individual countries 
and the division of world political regions.9 
 
Geostrategy: here refers to the macro-strategic thinking of the state in the international system 
based on the analysis of geographical reality and the realization of national strategic goals, involv-
ing foreign affairs, security, economics, and culture.10 
 
 
The rise of any country has almost a set of guidance under its own geopolitical theory. So far, 
western geopolitics has developed four classic geopolitical theories, namely, organic state theory, 
sea power theory, land power theory, and rim-land theory. Each theory is proposed by the researcher 
according to the reality, geopolitical pattern and geographical conflict of the country in which it is 
located. And in a certain historical period, the country will be guided to a staged prosperity. 
 
                                                 
7 Available from website: https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/geopolitics#cite_note-1, 2013 July 19, Timothy Garton Ash, 
“Where Dr Pangloss meets Machiavelli”, in The Guardian Weekly, volume 189, number 6, page 18. 
8 Marklund, C. (2015). "The return of geopolitics in the Era of Soft Power: Rereading Rudolf Kjellén on geopolitical 
imaginary and competitive identity." Geopolitics 20(2): 248-266. 
9 Cohen, S. B. (2014). Geopolitics: the geography of international relations, Rowman & Littlefield. 
10 Ištok, R. and D. Plavčanová (2015). "Geostrategic position of Slovakia (selected issues)." EJG 3: 5. 
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The topic of my thesis is about interpreter China’s BRI through geopolitical perspectives. BRI is a 
guiding strategy for China’s geostrategy and diplomacy in the past five years and even in the next 
decade. During the process of reading the literature, I found that many scholars habitually use 
Western geopolitical theory to analyze China’s geopolitical policies. After more than a hundred 
years of development and evolution, Western geopolitical science has formed a systematic and 
authoritative classical geopolitical theory, providing a set of geopolitical thinking models and epis-
temological frameworks. Affected by this, contemporary Western geopolitical elites will have two 
habitual thinking when interpreting the One Belt and Road Initiative: The first is the historical 
analogy, comparing China with the rising powers according to history; the other is the general sense 
that China will imitate the development model of Western countries in pursuit of expansion and 
hegemony. In my opinion, this way does not apply to China’s national conditions. First of all, alt-
hough China has not yet formed a complete geopolitical theory system, China’s current geostrate-
gic approach is traceable. China’s geostrategic choices are influenced by its history and culture for 
thousands of years. Secondly, each classical geopolitical theory proposed is one of the theoretical 
products required by the historical background, domestic and international reality at that period.11 
Therefore, in the theoretical part of this chapter, I will study the historical background and condi-
tions of the proposal of Western classical geopolitical theory, and theoretically analyze the cogni-
tive basis of Western classical geopolitical theory. Then I will discuss the geostrategic thinking of 
Chinese traditional Sun Tzu’s Art of War and the tributary trade rooted in the Chinese dynasty for 
thousands of years. It is thus concluded that the logic and intention of pushing to China's geostrate-
gic strategy based on Western classical geopolitical theory is not comprehensive. 
 
3.2 Western Classical Geopolitical Theory 
As an important scholarship in the study of international relations, geopolitics is an old topic. As 
early as in ancient Greece, Herodotus applied geography knowledge to the analysis and research 
in the fields of politics, diplomacy and military.12 Especially since the Swedish political scientist 
Rudolf Kjellén (he is the student of Friedrich Ratzel who proposed organic state theory.) creatively 
                                                 
11  Hu, Z. and D. Lu (2016). "Re-interpretation of the classical geopolitical theories in a critical geopolitical 
perspective." Journal of Geographical Sciences 26(12): 1769-1784. 
12 Lacoste, Y. (2012). "Geography, Geopolitics, and Geographical Reasoning." Hérodote(3): 14. 
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proposed the concept of “geopolitics” in 1899, 13geopolitical research was unique in the field of 
international relations. From a dynamic space perspective, a country’s territory, climate, resources, 
Research on geographical location and human characteristics has formed a set of geopolitical think-
ing models and epistemological frameworks.   
   
And to the present, the cognition of the hierarchical relationship between different cultures and 
countries is the hallmark of modern geopolitical imagination. As Simon mentioned in Green Poli-
tics, “The modern geopolitical imagination … both a Eurocentric worldview and a global vision, 
the product of an historic process connected to the expansion of European power over the last half 
millennium. We both see the world as a whole then divide it into a hierarchy of places, blocs and 
states which have attributes of political importance. In the process we make a series of conceptual 
transformations of time into space: modernity is here, primitiveness there.” 14 
   
Classical geopolitical theories mainly refer to land power theory proposed by Mackinder  
(British)15, sea power theory proposed by Mahan (American)16, organic state theory proposed by 
Ratzel (German)17 and rim-land theory proposed by Spykman (American)18. The four classical ge-
opolitical theories could be summarized in two perspectives, the space perspective and the power 
perspective. 19Land power theory and rim-land theory are space perspectives, sea power theory is 
the power perspective, and organic state theory is a combination of two perspectives.   
                                                 
13 Haggman, B. (1998). “Rudolf Kjellén and modern Swedish geopolitics.” Geopolitics 3(2): 100.  
14 Dalby, S. (2008). “Green geopolitics.” A companion to political geography: 440.   
15  Halford John Mackinder. The Geographical Pivot of History. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2011. [哈·麦金德. 历
史的 地理枢纽. 林尔蔚, 陈江, 译. 北京: 商务印书馆, 2011.] 
16  Alfred Thayer Mahan. The Influence of Sea Power upon History. Beijing: The People's LiberationArmy Press, 2006. 
[阿 尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉. 海权对历史的影响. 安常容, 成忠勤, 译. 北京: 解放军出版社, 2006.] 
17 Wang Enyong, Wang Zhengyi, Lou Yaoliang, et al. Geopolitics. Beijing: Higher Education Press, 2003. [王恩勇, 王
正 毅, 楼耀亮, 等. 政治地理学. 北京: 高等教育出版社, 2003.] 
18 Nicholas Spykman. The Geography of the Peace. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1965. [斯皮克曼. 和平地理学. 
刘愈 之, 译. 北京: 商务印书馆, 1965.] 
19 Hu, Z. and D. Lu (2016). “Re-interpretation of the classical geopolitical theories in a critical geopolitical perspective.” 
ACTA GEOGRAPHICA SINICA Vol.70, No.6:185   
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3.2.1 Space Perspective   
In the long history of geography development and the long-term tradition of geographer research, 
“There are four traditions whose identification provides an alternative to the competing monistic 
definitions that have been the geographer’s lot...The following discussion treats the traditions in 
this order: (1) a spatial tradition, (2) an area studies tradition, (3) a man-land tradition and (4) an 
earth science tradition.”20 Among them, space is one of the most important geographical concep-
tions, which has been considered as a core status in the study of geography for a long period. 
Philosophy and sociology have had an important impact on geoscientists’ research space and the 
study of geographical phenomena from a space perspective.21 Both Mackinder and Spykman ac-
cept the view that geographical factors have a significant impact on the country. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that they all propose geopolitical theory from a space perspective. In 1899, Mackinder 
served as the first director of the Department of Geosciences at the University of Oxford. At the 
time, the geographers at the University of Oxford regarded the world as a whole and considered it 
according to the natural unit, which had a great impact on Mackinder.22 At the same time, through-
out the 19th century, Russia was the most threatening to the United Kingdom, and Russia’s expan-
sion was of paramount importance to the world. Therefore, Mackinder proposed his land power 
theory from a space perspective, and considered the world as a whole, thus treating it as a complete 
political system.23 And he divided the world into the World-Island, the offshore islands and the 
outlying islands, the center of the land power, the so-called “geographical Pivot of history”, is the 
central part of Eurasia, roughly equivalent to the territory of the Soviet Union.24 Mackinder’s the-
ory can be summarized into three sentences: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; 
                                                 
20 Pattison, W. D. (1964). “The four traditions of geography.” Journal of Geography 63(5): 214. 
21 Hu, Z. and Luo, H. (2016). “Research Perspectives of Classic Geopolitical Theories and Their Enlightenment for 
Developing China’s New Geopolitical Theory” TROPICAL GEOGRAPHY Vol.34, No.2:184  
22 The introductory part of The Geographical Pivot of History, by E.W. Gilbert. 
23 Hu, Z. and D. Lu (2016). “Re-interpretation of the classical geopolitical theories in a critical geopolitical perspective.” 
ACTA GEOGRAPHICA SINICA Vol.70, No.6:856   
24 Mackinder, H. J. (2014). The geographical pivot of history. Geopolitics, Routledge: 44-48.   
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who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the 
world.” 25    
   
Based on Mackinder’s spatial division of the world, Spykman made some modifications. He de-
fined the middle areas between the heartland of the continent and the marginal sea as the rim-land 
of Eurasia.26 The spatial form of political activity in Eurasia, delineated by Mackinder, is the coun-
try where the nomadic people in the heartland of the mainland are pressing the fringe. However, 
Spykman pointed out that the spatial form of global political activities is always the same, that is, 
conflicts are always in the countries of certain marginal regions and the United Kingdom against 
other marginal regions and Russia, or the United Kingdom and Russia together against a powerful 
country that rules the rim-land.27 The United States has been involved in war twice in 30 years, and 
each time the fringe of Eurasia is about to be ruled by a single power. Because once the United 
States faces the united Eurasian marginal region, it will still find itself surrounded by a dominant 
force.28 It can be drawn that the land power theory and the rim-land theory based on the space 
perspective are primarily indicated in two sides: one is the historical investigation of spatial con-
flicts; the other is the spatial division based on geographical factors. The core of geopolitics from 
a space perspective is to analyze the spatial nature of national interests, that is, where the national 
interests are concentrated in the world.   
   
3.2.2 Power Perspective   
Power seems to be an eternal theme of international politics. In the real international political arena, 
power is the ubiquitous focus and the fundamental reason for constituting and deciding conflicts 
and cooperation.29 As a general of the US Navy, Mahan, who was deeply influenced by the ancient 
                                                 
25Mackinder, H. J. (2011). “Democratic ideals and reality.” Polis. Political Studies 2(2): 134-144.   
26 Sloan, G. R. (1988). Geopolitics in United States strategic policy, 1890-1987, Harvester Wheatsheaf: 16-19. 
27 Wilkinson, D. (1985). Spykman and geopolitics. On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear, Springer: 77-129. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ye Jiang and Yin Xiang (2008). A Comparative Analysis of Realism and Neo-liberal Institutional View of Power—
—Also on Different Understandings of Contemporary Power Patterns in Different Views of Power." International 
Political Studies. “现实主义与新自由制度主义权力观之比较分析——兼谈不同权力观对当代国际格局的不同
理解.” 国际政治研究(1): 131.      
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Greek naval commander Themistocles and the politician Pericles, proposed the sea power theory 
from the perspective of power.30 Mahan believes that the sea power is the most important for a 
country’s power. The main routes of the ocean can bring a lot of commercial benefits, so there must 
be a strong fleet to ensure the sea power.31 With the increase of US national power and the increase 
of overseas interests, the United States must develop a strong navy to protect overseas interests and 
ocean transportation and to fight against British maritime hegemony. 32At the same time, he also 
analyzed the ability of a country to obtain such maritime status depending on its geographical lo-
cation, land shape, territorial scope, population, national character and government policy.33 For 
power, it is a lasting topic in the international geopolitics. In addition, it is also the main reason for 
constituting and determining conflicts and cooperation. Therefore, Some Chinese scholars asserted: 
“the power perspective can guide and analyse the change of strength between states and the short 
board effect of state power.”34  
   
3.2.3 Combination of Space Perspective and Power Perspective   
Ratzel’s academic thinking is mainly from geographical Darwinism.35 He believes that human be-
ings are the product of the geographical environment, but because environmental control is limited, 
since location, space and boundaries are the three geographical factors that govern human distri-
bution and migration.36 On the basis of this understanding, he proposed the organic state theory 
and apply the biologist Darwin’s competitive choices and the concept of evolution to the survival 
                                                 
30 Hu, Z. and D. Lu (2016). “Re-interpretation of the classical geopolitical theories in a critical geopolitical perspective.” 
ACTA GEOGRAPHICA SINICA Vol.70, No.6:856   
31 Mahan, A. T. (2013). The influence of sea power upon history, 1660-1783, Read Books Ltd.:25-27 
32 James Holmes, “Mahan, a ‘Place in the Sun,’ and Germany’s Quest for Sea Power,” Comparative Strategy, 2004, 
Vol. 23, No. 1, p. 28. 
33 Hu, Z. and Luo, H. (2016). “Research Perspectives of Classic Geopolitical Theories and Their Enlightenment for 
Developing China’s New Geopolitical Theory” TROPICAL GEOGRAPHY Vol.34, No.2:18 
34Hu, Z. and D. Lu (2016). "Re-interpretation of the classical geopolitical theories in a critical geopolitical perspective." 
Journal of Geographical Sciences 26(12): 186 
35 Bassin, M. (1987). "Imperialism and the nation state in Friedrich Ratzel's political geography." Progress in human 
geography 11(4): 477 
36 Ibid:478 
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and development of the country. Because of his emphasis on the distribution and migration of hu-
mans such as space and boundaries, his geopolitical theory combines both space and power per-
spectives. In order to achieve this combination, Ratzel defined the main content of political geog-
raphy as a fixed base for studying the population movement. The size and shape of the country 
depend on its residents.37 In other words, the country expresses its population movement according 
to its population growth and decline. “A state, for example, was simply the result of a particular 
people’s adaptation to an environment. The form that a state or an entire culture took was therefore 
shaped by the relationship to Lebensraum and the struggle for it.”38 He regards the country as a 
biological organism. It has birth, growth, reproduction, growth, stagnation, sometimes illness, and 
finally death.39 But the theory of this theory is that geographical conditions are only not the deter-
mining factor of national development, but also for the survival of the country.40 He believes that 
expanding territory to neighboring countries is the basic law for a country to survive. However, the 
development of a state is mainly restricted by the law of social development. For example, the 
development of Japan as a small and island territory after the war can prove the restrictive effect 
of the law of social development on the survival and development of the country. 
 
Ratzel himself also recognized the shortcomings of his theory. He repeatedly emphasized that his 
theory was only an initiating argument. But then the theory was still used by geopolitical scholars 
of the German Nazi Party. They lead the people to believe that a strong country must expand its 
territory in order to survive.41 This theory became the excuse and basis for fascist external aggres-
sion and expansion. Therefore, a long time in the history, the study of geopolitics was ashamed to 
mention about this theory. 
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3.3 Situation and Experience of Four Classical Geopolitical Theories 
In order to further demonstrate these two kinds of perspectives put forward by the four classic 
geopolitical theories summarized above, this paper will provide historical evidence from two as-
pects of spatial conflict and power change to prove that each geopolitical theory has its own specific 
historical background and conditions.  Here I come up with two questions:   
   
1.Why was land power theory, sea power theory and organic state theory presented at almost the 
same time?   
   
2.Why Mackinder proposed the heartland theory for the British country as an island country, not 
the sea power theory. Spykman wanted to change Mahan’s sea power theory and put forward the 
rim-land theory?   
 
3.3.1 Space Conflict   
Here I will answer the second question I proposed before: why did Mackinder propose a land power 
theory for the United Kingdom as an island state? This is mainly because from the perspective of 
space, Russia is the biggest threat to British hegemony. As the place of origin of the first industrial 
revolution, Britain’s economic and technological power has dominated the world for a long time. 
Due to its strong economic support, the British colonial expansion overseas is also rapidly pro-
gressing. At this time, the United Kingdom, as one of the states which occupied the largest amounts 
of overseas colonies, its core interests are mainly concentrated in Eurasia.42 However, since 1828, 
Russia has expanded into Central Asia and the Caucasus. As Russia established its rule in Iran, 
Afghanistan and the Ottoman Empire, its influence has spread to the Indian border. Facing the 
majestic Russia in the north and the sense of impetus, the United Kingdom sent army to Afghani-
stan twice in 1838 and 1842 in an attempt to establish a pro-British regime there.43 Faced with the 
powerful forces established by Russia on the Eurasian continent, it has already created a huge threat 
to the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom especially fears that Russia and Germany will form 
                                                 
42 Marshall P J. Cambridge illustration of the history of the British Empire [M]. Fan Xinzhi, translated. Beijing: World 
Knowledge Publishing House, 2004. 
43 Ingram, E. (2013). In Defence of British India: Great Britain in the Middle East, pp. 7-19, Routledge. 
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an alliance to control the hub area and then unify Eurasia, thus transforming the power of sea power 
and land power in a direction favorable to land rights. Land rights pose a threat to sea power, and 
then build on the sea. The UK’s global hegemony based on the power of advantage creates chal-
lenges.44 Since it is not difficult to understand that Mackinder proposed the geopolitical spatial 
strategic intention of land power theory.   
   
The same reason, when Spykman proposed the rim-land theory, the United States has experienced 
two world wars. In World War II, many of the US strategies were to prevent the strong countries 
of Eurasia from controlling the fringe. The US national interests and national conflicts after World 
War II have spread throughout Eurasia. Therefore, combined with historical wars and the partici-
pation of the United States in the practice of Second World War, and based on the future of the 
United States to dominate the global strategy, Spykman’s analysis focuses not on the causes of war 
itself, but on the space struggle or space conflict of war.   
  
3.3.2 Strength Changes among Countries   
In 1890, Mahan proposed the sea power theory for the United States. In 1896, Ratzel proposed the 
organic state theory in Germany. In 1904, Mackinder proposed the land power theory for the United 
Kingdom. By 1944, Spykman proposed the rim-land theory for the United States. They have pro-
posed four classic geopolitical theories in more than half a century, which is coupled with the tra-
jectory of national economic development or strength change at that time.   
  
In 1870, the world share of US GDP began to approach the United Kingdom, and this was the 
second period of industrial revolution in the United States. In just 20 years, the US manufacturing 
industry and agriculture have achieved great development, and they must abandon isolationism and 
expand overseas.45 However, in the 1880s, the US Navy was merely a fleet of about 140 outdated 
wooden structures, without an armored ship.46 The biggest threat to the United States is on the sea, 
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from the United Kingdom. Therefore, Mahan’s sea power theory has adapted to the growth of the 
US economy, foreign trade and overall strength.   
   
From 1870 to 1913, Germany’s economic and military strength gained tremendously. By 1913, its 
GDP accounted for more than the world’s share of world.47 With the development of the economy, 
overpopulation was considered to be one of the major problems faced by European countries at the 
time, and this was the most serious in Germany.48 For Ratzel and his followers, there is an inextri-
cable link between the development of the country and the availability of sufficient space, and in 
Europe, territorial expansion is considered the only way to obtain living space. This is why the 
theory introduced by Ratzel is completely different from other geopolitical theories. His organic 
state theory is essentially a solution that pursues territorial expansion to solve serious domestic 
conflict of overpopulation. Then the Nazi leaders who pursued the theory achieved their expansion 
goals through racial expulsion or extinction. The German geopolitical school is also deliberately 
distorting the essence of geopolitical theory, advocating extreme geographical determinism, be-
coming a theoretical tool for aggression and expansion in Germany during World War II, and has 
been criticized by the world and led to the decline of entire geopolitical theory after World War II. 
49 
   
Mackinder proposed that the land power theory also adapted to the changes in British power at that 
time. After 1870, the UK’s economic development began to decline. By 1913 its overall economic 
strength had been surpassed by the US, the former Soviet Union as well as Germany.50 Although 
the territorial expansion of the UK was equally striking in the late 19th century, the volume of 
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overseas trade grew tremendously and overseas investment increased significantly, but it was seri-
ously threatened. This threat mainly came from Russia. Therefore, in order to fight against Russia, 
maintain British hegemony, and slow down the recession, Mackinder constructed its geostrategic 
theory.   
 
3.4 Chinese Traditional Geostrategic Thinking 
The analysis and research of various geographical elements has become the basis and premise for 
revealing the geostrategic rules and exploring the formation and development of ancient geostrate-
gic ideas. Geographically, Chinese civilization originated in East Asia, occupying the Eurasian 
continent in the east and facing the Pacific Ocean. In the east and south of the region is the sea, the 
west is the plateau and the desert, and the north is the wasteland. This geographical pattern semi-
closes China and the other parts of the world, thus maintaining a strong independence.51 The birth-
place of Chinese civilization and culture is mainly concentrated in the middle and lower reaches of 
the Yellow River and the Yangtze River basin. It is a typical agricultural region. This geographical 
feature deeply influences and finally determines the characteristics of ancient Chinese geostrategy. 
Therefore, since the records of his own history, it has not been manifested as the expansion of 
geopolitical power as in the West, but more as a check and balance of geopolitical power. This is 
also the point I want to make in this chapter. This is also the biggest difference between Chinese 
geopolitical thinking and Western geopolitical theory. In addition, “history matters. It matters not 
just because we can learn from the past, but because the present and the future are connected to the 
past by the continuity of society's institutions. Today's and tomorrow's choices are shaped by the 
past.”52 Therefore, so as to recognize the logic of the geopolitical reconstruction in modern China, 
we need to date back to the historical evolution of China's geopolitical strategy. Therefore, in the 
next section I will study these two issues. How has China's geopolitical economic strategy evolved 
in history? How does it shape or influence China's current geopolitical economic strategy? 
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pp. 96. 
52 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Charve and Economic Petorrnance, New York: Cambridge  
University Press, 1990, Preface, pp.vii. 
Page | 26  
 
3.4.1 The Geographical Thought of Sun Tzu’s Art of War 
 The most representative of China’s ancient geopolitical strategy and military strategic thinking is 
represented by the core idea of Sun Tzu’s Art of War.53 It is the oldest book in the world which has 
the scent of geopolitics. There are thirteen articles in the book. Among them, the “Variation in 
Tactics” and “Terrain” and “The Nine Situations”54 all evaluate the influence and significance of 
space on political activities from a geographical point of view. Sun Tzu holds that geography is the 
basis for analyzing and judging the political situation, the terrain is an auxiliary condition for war.55 
All military activities cannot be separated from the terrain, and the corresponding operational prin-
ciples must be determined according to the specific terrain. For example, in the stalemate, it is 
necessary to use the steep mountains as a dependency, and then separated by the river; in the melee, 
it is necessary to reinforce the fortifications and transfer the masses and materials so that the enemy 
cannot attack the stronghold.56 These have, to a certain extent, embodied the germination of geo-
political thinking. 
 
Although Sun Tzu’s Art of War is a book that guides how to fight, Sun Tzu does not advocate the 
use of war to resolve conflicts between nations. He first linked the war to the survival of the country, 
so the survival and defeat in the war must be carefully analyzed. The thinking of being cautious in 
war as the Sun Tzu’s basic attitude toward war runs through his entire comprehensive and complete 
system of war thoughts. “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”57 This 
is the ideal state of war for Sun Tzu. In the inevitable situation of war, he set three thresholds for 
the war: “Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to 
be gained; fight not unless the position is critical.”58 The above three principles are his thinking of 
being cautious in war further embodiment. 
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3.4.2 The Ideal and Real Situation of Thinking of Being Cautious in War 
As a realist strategist, Sun Tzu’s wisdom of being cautious in war is based on his deep understand-
ing of war. His first sentence in “The Art of War” is: “The art of war is of vital importance to the 
State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry 
which can on no account be neglected.”59 Sun Tzu warned the monarch and the general, must be 
cautious in the decision-making of war, and must not easily launch a war, otherwise the country 
may suffer huge economic losses or even demise. This is the strategy that Sun Tzu put forward in 
the decision-making of war, a high-level strategic thinking, that is, “The supreme art of war is to 
subdue the enemy without fighting.”60 This strategic thinking is the highest ideal pursuit of Sun 
Tzu’s thinking of being cautious in war. This pursuit is based on safeguarding the fundamental 
interests of the country. 
 
In order to realize the ideal situation of subduing the enemy without fighting, Sun Tzu proposed 
two methods at the strategic level, balk the enemy’s plans, so that the enemy has to give up the 
attempt to confront us; prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces, destroy the alliance of the hostile 
forces and expand its allies so that the enemy can succumb to us. The use of force and war to attack 
the enemy is the lowest way.61 
 
In reality, in the era when the war was frequent, Sun Tzu raised this point: If it is to your advantage, 
make a forward move; if not, stay where you are.62 The specific conditions are the three points 
mentioned above: Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is some-
thing to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical. If it is not in the national interest, if there 
is no confidence to win, if the country does not suffer a serious crisis, the monarch must treat the 
war with caution.63 Under the premise of reducing the frequency of war and reducing unnecessary 
wars, if war cannot be avoided, he advocates the use of war and force to safeguard national interests 
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and national security. The generals must carefully plan the war, minimize the possible losses caused 
by the war, and strive to win the war with the least cost.  
 
3.4.3 Sun Tzu’s Geo-environmental Thinking 
Sun Tzu’s geo-environmental thinking refers to the rational understanding of military terrain clas-
sification and battlefield environment analysis based on geography. It can be regarded as the first 
level of Sun Tzu’s geo-ideal thinking and the foundation of its geo-ideal thinking. According to the 
description from The Art of War, the so-called geo-environment of Sun Tzu can be divided into 
military terrain and battlefield environment. The former belongs to the category of physical geog-
raphy and the latter belongs to the category of human geography.64 Sun Tzu said: “The art of war 
recognizes nine varieties of ground: Dispersive ground; facile ground; contentious ground; open 
ground; ground of intersecting highways; serious ground; difficult ground; hemmed-in ground; 
desperate ground.”65 
 
He pointed out that the areas where the princes fought in their own territory were called dispersive 
ground; those that entered the enemy’s not-deep areas were called facile ground; the areas where 
we got favorable and the enemy got favorable were called contentious ground; The area where we 
can go, the enemy can come is called open ground; the area adjacent to the vassal states, the area 
where the vassal state aid can be obtained first, called ground of intersecting highways; the area 
deep in the enemy’s hinterland, backed by the enemy’s numerous cities, is called serious ground; 
Difficult obstacles, swamps and other difficult areas are called difficult ground; the army enters a 
narrow road, the road to retracement is far away, and the enemy can defeat many areas of our 
strength with a small amount of troops, called hemmed-in ground;  You can survive if you fight 
hard, and you will die if you don’t actively resist it. It is called desperate ground.66  
 
He also put forward clear principles for the treatment of these nine environments: 1.Do not fight in 
the dispersive ground; 2.Do not stay in the facile ground; 3. Do not attack in the contentious ground; 
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4.Do not sever contact in the open ground; 5.In the ground of intersecting highways to make trib-
utary allies; 6.in the serious ground to plunder the grain; 7.in the difficult ground to quickly pass; 
8.In the hemmed-in ground, you should use your strategy to get out of danger;  9.Fight hard in the 
desperate ground.67 
 
Among them, Sun Tzu placed a high premium on the ground of intersecting highways. The traffic 
location of the ground of intersecting highways is very important. This is also a strategic point 
where the interests of many countries are intertwined and the strategists of past dynasties have to 
contend for each other. As a result, there are many diplomatic incidents and wars in the ground of 
intersecting highways. And this idea coincides with the current Belt and Road thinking. The current 
policy of the Chinese government is to develop relations and diplomacy with these transportation 
hub countries to expand their development. The attitude of the Sun Tzu's art of Being Cautious in 
War or no war, is also the attitude that China now expresses in the international community. The 
Chinese Foreign Ministry has always stated that China must adhere to a path of peaceful develop-
ment, not take the initiative to wage war, and cooperate through interests to achieve its goals. 
 
3.5 Tributary Trade System in Ancient China 
If geopolitical thinking in Sun Tzu’s art of war is the cornerstone of China’s contemporary geopo-
litical strategy, the tributary trade in ancient China is a framework for BRI. The foreign relations 
in ancient China were deeply influenced by Chinese traditional philosophical culture. The tributary 
trade system embodied the ideal state of Chinese ancient diplomatic thought. The tributary trade is 
a way of dealing with foreign relations in accordance with Chinese Confucian traditional culture. 
It has strong ethics.68 It does not completely exclude military, but the military as an unconventional 
way, emphasizing the establishment of a harmonious order in an ethical way can be called ethical 
idealism.69 The tributary trade system has existed in the history of ancient China in the past 1500 
years. And the connotation of it is very rich. 
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The earliest tribute began as a political concept in China, during the Western Zhou Dynasty 
(AD1046-AD256). The tribute trade at this time reflected the political view of dealing with the 
relations between the various ministries in the surrounding area. It is centered on the Zhou Dynasty 
and divides the surrounding tribes according to the distance. The countries at the outermost level 
must tribute gifts to the monarchs of the Zhou Dynasty. They must recognize the dominance of the 
monarchs of the Zhou Dynasty and fulfill their pilgrimages. If you are not tribute, you will be 
punished or be levied by force.70 
 
The formation of the tributary is related to the attraction of the feudal political system centered on 
Confucian culture in China. The most typical in the Tang Dynasty (618-907). The power of the 
Tang Dynasty was strong, it was an era of great unity and an era of pioneering and outward-oriented. 
The strong performance of the Tang Dynasty was attracted by the ritual system, including advanced 
politics, economy, culture, education system, and even customs. The countries most affected are 
North Korea, Japan and Vietnam. In the relationship between the output and acceptance of politics 
and culture, the Chinese cultural circle characterized by the export of Confucian culture is formed.71 
In a nutshell, the interactions of human society are usually manifested in three forms of military 
conquest, trade and cultural communication. Culture and identity are not necessary conditions for 
the formation of a regional cooperation system, but it is undoubtedly a form of advanced civiliza-
tion. In terms of the spread of culture, the existence of heterogeneous culture is a prerequisite for 
communication. Through the collision, conflict and gradual integration in the process of commu-
nication, new cultural factors are generated. However, cultural differences still exist and are the 
foundation for the next cultural conflict. Through such a cycle of recurring cycles, culture com-
pletes the exchange of energy with the outside world and gains new vitality.72 
 
In the Song Dynasty (960-1279), the national policy at that time focused on self-protection, and 
the promotion of tribute trade was not backed by force. The priority position of tribute and trade is 
reversed. Several separatist regimes have emerged in China. During this period, the existence of 
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the tributary trade system adapted to the development of the commodity economy and promoted 
trade between Song and Southeast Asian countries.73  
 
However, tributary trade is not a perfect system. The ancient civilization empire generally takes 
the central state as the axis and forms a relatively closed area. Coupled with the relatively special 
geographical environment of the East Asian continent and the limitations of the ancient people’s 
horizons, the Chinese feudal dynasty that flourished in the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers has always 
thought it is the center of the world. This self-positioning is relatively blind.74 The tributary trade 
system is an ideal state of Chinese Confucianism. Its main purpose is tribute rather than trade.75 
The tributary is a hierarchical society for the ideals of Confucianism, and its core is the appeal of 
culture. However, according to the realist point of view, in order to achieve this goal, realistic means 
must be taken, such as the temptation of interest or the coercion of force. Because it is clear that 
tribute trade is divided by political hierarchy, and it is difficult to achieve fairness and balance, 
because wars and conflicts are often difficult to avoid.76 
 
Each system or model contains a set of internal coherence (regardless of formal or informal) rules 
that define the actors’ roles, specific behaviors, and shape people’s expectations.77 The maintenance 
of the tribute trade must meet the expectations of both parties. The tribute side is looking forward 
to trade rather than tribute, which is an economic benefit; the Chinese dynasty is looking forward 
to tribute rather than trade, which is a political interest. Once the cooperation system fails to meet 
the expectations of both parties, it will lead to a paralysis of the cooperation system and even a war. 
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3.6 Analysis 
From this perspective, in fact, China’s BRI which is a way of giving economic benefits to neigh-
boring countries in exchange for benefits, is rooted in Chinese tradition. The dynasties in Chinese 
history usually supply money, giving and other material profits to surrounding countries in various 
approaches in exchange for the latter’s political compliance with China. This system is an important 
means by which the rulers of ancient China fulfilled their geopolitical goals, that is, the political 
needs of self-defense and the medium of international relations and diplomacy. The tribute trade 
helps China achieve the geostrategic goal of attracting many countries around it to its own-centered 
rules, thereby exchanging political power with the loss of economic interests.  
  
There are obvious differences between the tributary trade in ancient China and the current One Belt 
and Road Initiative in content and scope, but they have great similarities in terms of operation form 
and purpose. One of the core targets of BRI is to balance and exchange interests in accordance with 
the general trend of China’s rise. Second, it can also expand China’s influence, such as raising the 
status of the RMB in the international monetary system; the most similar point, BRI and the tribute 
trade are all trying to establish a set of rules that can be self-centered.78 Therefore, it can be seen 
that the strategic layout behind the China’s BRI is in fact significantly different from the four classic 
geopolitical theories mentioned earlier. As a land-sea composite country, China’s adoption of a 
single sea power strategy or land power strategy is insufficient to meet its development needs. 
From this perspective, BRI is actually a new set of geopolitical strategies with Chinese character-
istics based on China’s inheritance of its own historical experience. Its purpose is to break the long-
standing pattern of separation of land power and sea power, which promote the formation of a 
geopolitical spatial pattern in which Eurasia is fully integrated with the Pacific Ocean, the Atlantic 
Ocean and the Indian Ocean.79  
  
The thought in Sun Tzu’s Art of War, as a geopolitical ideology that has been inherited for thou-
sands of years in China, has also exerted tremendous influence in the contemporary era. From the 
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perspective of strategic guidance, Sun Tzu focuses on solving the contradictory problems by diplo-
macy and strategy and opposes the suppression of violence and physical means. BRI also reflects 
Chinese government desire to exaggerate its international effect through diplomatic and economic 
means. Because in the traditional political concept of China, once a war occurs, it will inevitably 
lead to huge losses. However, “Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless 
there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical”80, this kind of evasive 
attitude toward war does not effectively promote the peace process in a certain sense, but it is an 
interest-oriented choice. At present, China is not attempting to establish a split-new international 
order; China’s target is not to overthrow the global order it does not like, but to make it more in 
line with its own interests and rules of conduct. 
 
In addition, although I explicitly stated in the previous chapter, China’s geopolitical theory should 
not be understood using Western classical geopolitical theory. However, it is undeniable that the 
areas covered by BRI overlap with the strategically important areas of these classic geo-theories. 
“One Belt” mainly runs through the Eurasian continent, passing through what McIntosh calls the 
“heart zone”; “One Road” moves with the sea, and it covers the rimland that Spykman claims. In 
the following chapters, I will analyze the interest orientation of the China BRI and then analyze the 
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Chapter 4. China’s One Belt and Road Initiative 
 
One Belt and Road Initiative is a transnational economic belt initiated and led by Chinese govern-
ment in 2013. It covers the history of the Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road through China, 
Central Asia, North and West Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean coast.81  
 
In September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan and delivered a speech enti-
tled “Promote Friendship Between Our People and Work Together to Build a Bright Future” at the 
University of Nazabayev.82 In this speech, he proposed to jointly build the Silk Road Economic 
Belt, an initiative to connect Europe through the Asia-Pacific region. In October 2013, during his 
visit to Indonesia, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech entitled “Towards A Closer ASEAN-
China Community of Shared Future”83 and formally proposed the construction of “21st-Century 
Maritime Silk Road”84 in the 21st century, developing economic cooperation between China and 
Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. These two strategic ideas 
are collectively called “One Belt and Road.” 
 
On February 1, 2015, the leading group for the construction of BRI led by Zhang Gaoli, member 
of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier 
of the State Council, was formally established. In March of the same year, Chinese Premier Li 
Keqiang further promoted the “One Belt and Road” during his visits in Asia and Europe and wrote 
it into the government work report.85 On the 28th, the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
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China authorized the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, and the Ministry of Commerce to jointly publish a white paper entitled “Vision and actions 
on jointly building Belt and Road.”86 
 
After that, One Belt and Road strategy was gradually launched under the promotion of the Chinese 
government, mainly including the following processes: 
 
 
1. In order to meet the financing needs of BRI infrastructure, China led the establishment of 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Silk Road Fund (the Chinese government 
established the Silk Road Fund in 2014 and invested US$40 billion as a start-up fund.87 By 
2017, the fund’s funding had reached $100 billion.88), New Development Bank (NDB) and 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Development Bank (SCODB), has injected a lot of 
liquidity into the infrastructure construction of BRI with the situation of multilateral 
development institutions. On March 12, 2015, the UK took the lead in signing up for the 
intention to become a member of AIIB.89 The next day, Switzerland also made a willingness 
to apply. Subsequently, developed countries such as France, Italy and Germany also 
followed suit. Countries such as South Korea and Russia and Brazil also applied to join the 
founding member countries before March 31 of the application deadline.90 In terms of 
diplomacy with European countries, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Europe in March 
2019, Italy became the first G7 member to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on 
BRI.91 During the second BRI summit in Beijing in late April, Ueli Maurer, President and 
                                                 
86 “Vision and actions on jointly building Belt and Road”, March, 2015, Authorized by the State Council of China, 
available at: http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201503/t20150328_669091.html 
87 Xi Jinping's speech at the opening ceremony of the “Belt and Road” International Cooperation Summit Forum, 
Xinhua Net, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-05/14/c_1120969677.htm. 
88 List of results of the “Belt and Road” International Cooperation Summit Forum (Full Text). Xinhua Net, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2017-05/16/c_1120976848.htm. 
89 Zhang Pengju (2018). “Research on international financial cooperation in the field of “Belt and Road” infrastructure 
construction”, University of International Business and Economics: pp. 20. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Italy joins China's New Silk Road project: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-47679760  
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Minister of Finance of Switzerland, signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation 
between China and China under BRI framework.92 
 
 
2. In May 2013, Premier Li Keqiang proposed the idea of building a China-Pakistan economic 
corridor when he visited Pakistan.93 The main intention was to promote energy cooperation, 
industrial cooperation, and land and sea transport. In April 2015, when President Xi Jinping 
visited Pakistan, he made a statement with the leaders of Pakistan on the joint construction 
of Karakoram Highway, Gwadar Port, New International Airport and cross-border optical 
cable construction, with the aim of promoting the interconnection between Central Asia 
and South Asia. The first is the railway. In 2015, China Railway Corporation and Pakistan 
signed an agreement on the upgrade of No. 1Railway Trunk Line (ML1) to prepare for the 
transformation and upgrading of the Pakistan Railway94. In addition, the feasibility study 
of the China-Pakistan Railway has been completed. The second is aviation. In October 2015, 
Air China opened the direct flight route from Beijing to Islamabad, which was the first air 
passage in Beijing and Islamabad. The third is the highway.95 In August 2013, China began 
to renovate the road reconstruction project in the Karakorum-Brunn section. In 2017, China 
invested 3.2 billion U.S. dollars to renovate the Blumkou to Hongqila Port section and is 
expected to be completed in 2020.96 Pakistan also introduced the East, Central and West 
Supporting Public Development Project (PSDP) for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. 
The west line of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is divided into five regions, all of 
                                                 
92 Switzerland joins BRI as the initiative extends further into central Europe: 
https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d514f30556a4d34457a6333566d54/index.html 
93 Premier Li Keqiang's speech at the Pakistani Senate:  
http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-05/24/content_2410141.htm  
94 China-Pakistan Jointly Launches China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Railway Project Feasibility Study and Signs 
Cooperation Document:http://www.nra.gov.cn/xwzx/gjjl/wsdt/201504/t20150422_13227.shtml  
95 Jiang Hui (2018). “Research on the relationship between China's direct investment in the “Belt and Road” countries 
and bilateral economic growth”. University of International Business and Economics: pp. 46. 
96 Part of China-Bajstan Road is completed and opened to traffic: 
 http://www.zgkashi.com/ydyl/201702/t20170208_32895.html  
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which have been started and completed in June 2018.97 On January 4, 2018, the Pakistani 
central bank announced that since then, bilateral trade between China and Pakistan can be 
settled through the renminbi and abandon the US dollar settlement.98 
 
3. In terms of cross-border logistics and transportation cooperation, China Railway 
Corporation cooperated with railway companies in Central Asia and Europe to build 
CHINA RAILWAY Express (CR express) and ended their independence in 2016. The brand 
“CHINA RAILWAY Express” was officially opened99. According to statistics, in 2014, CR 
express has already started 308 trains. In 2015, 815 trains were opened. In 2016, 1702 trains 
were opened, up 109% year-on-year.100 By the end of 2016, CR express have already 
opened more than 2,900 trains, transporting goods up to 260,000 TEUs, driving import and 
export trade totally more than 20 billion US dollars, and achieving total import and export 
trade of more than 20 billion US dollars. 101  “The CR express Construction and 
Development Plan (2016-2020)”102 promulgated by the National Development and Reform 
Commission of China proposes that in 2020, CR express will plan to operate around 5,000 
trains. In addition, the Chinese-led AIIB is also planning to lay a new Silk Road. Its first 
projects include a 64-kilometer highway in Pakistan, a highway from the capital of 
Tajikistan to the border between the country and Uzbekistan, and Almaty in Kazakhstan.103 
The three Central Asian and Pakistani traffic routes, including a loop. From the perspective 
                                                 
97  Pakistan will formulate four-year plan for supporting projects of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: 
http://karachi.mofcom.gov.cn/article/c/201507/20150701040163.shtml  
98  Liang Zhenmin(2018), “Construction of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Significance, Progress and Path 
Research”, Asia-Pacific Economics, pp. 13-20. 
99 China Railway Express to Europe: 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/china_key_words/2017-04/20/content_40657257.htm 
100 Ibid. 
101 Zhang Pengju (2018). “Research on international financial cooperation in the field of “Belt and Road” infrastructure 
construction”, University of International Business and Economics: pp. 36. 
102 The CRexpress Construction and Development Plan (2016-2020): 
 http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbghwb/201610/P020161017547345656182.pdf  
103 Zhang Pengju (2018). “Research on international financial cooperation in the field of “Belt and Road” infrastructure 
construction”, University of International Business and Economics: pp. 37. 
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of road transport cooperation, in July 2016, China formally joined and signed the 
International Road Transport (TIR), becoming the 70th Convention of the Convention, 
which came into effect on May 5, 2017.104 China’s accession to the TIR Convention has 
taken an important step in promoting the development of road transport and multimodal 
transport in Asia and Europe. It has become a booster for China's BRI construction, and 
also promotes economic and trade cooperation between BRI countries which providing 
strong hardware support. After joining the T1R Convention, China's cargo containers can 
be transported directly to Ireland by road. The transportation time with European countries 
and regions will be reduced from an average of 28 days to an average of 21 days for road 
transport and 14 days for rail transport.105  
 
4. China has invested in large-scale infrastructure construction in BRI countries. The Chinese 
government is leading the establishment of a shipping port in Hambantota, Sri Lanka.106 
The first phase of the port project was started on November 8, 2010. The first “Jetliner” 
ship was ceremonially anchored at the port facility, and the former president of the port, 
Mahinda Rajapaksa, was named. The Port Authority of Sri Lanka is responsible for inland 
construction and management. The estimated total construction cost for the first phase of 
the project is US$361 million. The Export-Import Bank of China accounts for 85% of the 
investment.107 At the same time, China has also entered the railway construction market in 
Bangladesh. In September 2017, China Civil Engineering Corporation won the second 
tender of the Cocos Bazaar Railway in Bangladesh and became the first project of the 
Division to win the bid in Bangladesh. In May 2014, China agreed to fund the construction 
of a new East African railway with a view to eventually connecting the six East African 
                                                 
104 https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-joins-tir-convention-opens-borders-international-trucking/ 
105 Zhang Pengju (2018). “Research on international financial cooperation in the field of “Belt and Road” infrastructure 
construction”, University of International Business and Economics: pp. 37. 
106 https://www.ship-technology.com/features/hambantota-port-china-sri-lanka/  
107 Das, K. C. (2017). The making of one belt, one road and dilemmas in South Asia. China Report, 53(2), 125-142 
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countries.108 The Chinese government is also involved in investing in water conservancy 
projects in South Asia. China Water Resources and Electric Power Corporation has two 
hydropower projects in the Upper Marti Hydropower Project and the Nasuwakari 
Hydropower Project in Nepal, the former of which was officially connected to the grid on 




















                                                 
108 Ma, J., Balezentis, T., Zhao, Z., & Fang, C. (2017). ONE BELT ONE ROAD (OBOR) INITIATIVE IN CENTRAL 
ASIA: THE STUDY OF OBOR ON CHINA AND CENTRAL ASIA AGRICULTURAL TRADE. Transformations in 
Business & Economics, 16(3). 
109 List of results of the “Belt and Road” International Cooperation Summit Forum (Full Text). Xinhua Net, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2017-05/16/c_1120976848.htm. 
Page | 40  
 
Chapter 5. Analysis: China’s Intention 
 
5.1 China’s Social Situation Background 
 
5.1.1 Overcapacity and Causes 
Overcapacity refers to the fact that due to the limitation of total social demand, economic activities 
have not attained the ordinary standard of export, thence resources are not entirely utilized, and 
production capacity (or capacity output) has been idle to some extent.110 The original merchandise 
export structure is relatively simple, and the market is mature, which does not help to solve the 
domestic overcapacity. For companies that occupy a leadership or monopoly position, in order to 
maintain their status, they will even produce more products in an uncertain environment than in a 
certain environment.111 
 
From the domestic background of China, overcapacity has become a major obstacle to China’s 
economic growth. The current stage of China’s economy is the three periods superimposed. The 
so-called “The three periods superimposed”, that is, the economic slowdown period, the structural 
adjustment period, and the pre-stimulation policy digestive period.112 The original merchandise 
export structure is relatively simple, the market is mature, and there is no obvious help in solving 
China's domestic overcapacity. 
 
In the past, China has maintained rapid growth Since the Reform and Opening in 1978, and the 
average annual growth rate of GDP in 1978-2018 was 9.5%.113 In half of the years after 2001, the 
                                                 
110 Xiong Ailun, Pu Yongjian, Zhang Yong(2015), “One Belt and One Road” and Excess Capacity Transfer” “一带一
路”与过剩产能转移: pp. 75. 
111 ③Scott Clark (1973), “Labor Hoarding in Durable Goods Industries”, The American Economic Review: pp. 811-
824. 
112In February 2014, Xi Jinping made a judgment on the stage of China's economic development in his speech on 
“Comrade Xi Jinping's Important Discussion on Economic Work since the Eighteenth National Congress”. He believed 
that the Chinese economy was in the period of “The three periods superimposed”. Available at: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0222/c64094-24435968.html  
113 Data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/  
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first driver of GDP growth in China was investment. In 2009, the GDP growth rate was 9.2%, the 
investment contribution rate was 86%, and the export contribution rate was -42%.114 Specific to 
the investment field, from 2003 to 2014, China’s fixed asset investment mainly flowed to the man-
ufacturing and real estate industries, with an average annual investment growth rate of 25% and 
24% respectively.115 A large amount of capital fund has poured into the traditional industries, such 
as steel, cement, flat glass, chemical, textile, metal, paper, etc.,116 which has resulted a quick growth 
in productivity and the quality of their products. After 2008, went through the financial crisis, mar-
ket demand begins to decline. However, at the same time, there was no corresponding reduction in 
investment, and it still maintained a high-speed rise, which eventually led to excessive investment. 
 
China’s main economy is a state-owned enterprise, so the central government and local govern-
ments play a major influence in China’s investment-driven growth model, which formulates and 
implements policies that focus on economic growth, such as five-year plans, industrial strategies, 
and related fiscal, financial, and trade policies.117 These policies have spurred investment in key 
industries that have a significant impact on economic growth and employment. In addition, local 
governments are also actively encouraging companies to expand investment, even in the face of 
overcapacity and over-investment. 
 
Second, at the industrial level, China’s strong economic growth has strengthened market confi-
dence, prompting both state-owned and private companies to expand investment as an major part 
of their development plans. However, China’s huge market size and transition to a market economy 
have increased the difficulty of market coordination. In addition, Chinese companies tend to invest 
in highly competitive emerging industries, which also leads to over-investment.118 
                                                 
114 Data all from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, available at:  
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjzs/tjsj/tjcb/dysj/201412/t20141231_662243.html 
115 Ibid. 
116  Liu Lei, Bu Xiaoning, Zhang Meng (2018), “Improvement of global value chain status and overcapacity in 
manufacturing industry”, Economic Review: pp. 47. 
117  China Development Research Foundation Funded Project, 2013 China National Economic Operation 
Comprehensive Report (3) - New Situation and New Countermeasures for China's Current Overcapacity. 
118 The State Council, China's Cabinet, “Emerging Sectors of Strategic Importance during the 13th Five-Year Plan 
Period (2016-20)” 
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Third, since the 2008 financial crisis, the Chinese government carried out a large-scale stimulus 
plan for steady growth and formed a large amount of public infrastructure investment (mainly con-
centrated in the transportation and power industries).119 This move has greatly stimulated the en-
thusiasm of investors and led to the quick resume and growth of traditional industries such as steel, 
cement and metals. In addition to fiscal stimulus, the government has adopted a policy of credit 
expansion and interest rate cuts to stimulate economic growth.120 
 
Subsequently, the government also introduced the “Ten Industry Adjustment and Revitalization 
Plan” to promote the growth and employment of ten key industries such as steel, shipbuilding, 
textile, light industry, non-ferrous metals, equipment manufacturing, petrochemical, automobile, 
electronic information and logistics.121 The plan introduced a number of supporting policies, in-
cluding government funds, credit support, tax breaks and so on. These stimulus policies helped 
Chinese companies recover after the financial crisis, and also promoted economic stability and 
sustainability, but also exacerbated China's overcapacity. 
 
The imperfection of China’s entire market mechanism itself is the underlying cause of overcapacity. 
China’s resource factor marketization reform is lagging behind, policies, planning, standards, en-
vironmental protection and other guidance and constraints are not strong, investment systems and 
management methods are not perfect, supervision and inspection and accountability are not in place, 
leading to distortions in production factors and fair competition market environment.122 Unsound, 
the market mechanism has not been effectively implemented, the backward production capacity 
has been outdated, and the contradiction of overcapacity has intensified. 
                                                 
119  China Development Research Foundation Funded Project, 2013 China National Economic Operation 
Comprehensive Report (3) - New Situation and New Countermeasures for China's Current Overcapacity: pp. 7. 
120 “The 10th Anniversary of the Global Financial Crisis: Lessons and Challenges——A Summary of the Symposium 
of the China Social Science Forum”, International Economic Review,2019, Chapter. China’s Perspective. 
121  “Opinions on Implementing the Adjustment and Revitalization Plan of Ten Key Industries and Further 
Strengthening Standardization Work” :http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-07/03/content_1356554.htm  
122 Yu Yujie, Jin Yang (2018), “The Status Quo, Causes and Countermeasures of Overcapacity”. Journal of Chang'an 
University: pp. 10. 
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5.1.2 Current Status of Overcapacity 
 
The chart below is a summary of China’s State Council Documents mentioned Overcapacity In-
dustries over the years. It can be seen that overcapacity is primarily mainly focus on steel, coal, 
cement, electrolytic aluminium, flat glass and other industries, and it is recurring. The five overca-
pacity industries mentioned in 2013 were almost completely covered in the 2007 document. Among 
them, the most frequently mentioned are the two major industries of steel and coal. Industries such 
as textiles have once become overcapacity industries, but they are no longer mentioned as overca-
pacity industries after 2006. For example, in the steel industry, the period of severe overcapacity is 
2012-2016. Steel is the most overcapacity industry. In 2015, China’s crude steel output attained 
804 million tons, almost half of the world’s total, with a production capacity of about 1.2 billion 
tons and a capacity utilization rate of only 67%.123 
 
China’s State Council Documents mentioned Overcapacity Industries 
File number Overcapacity Industries 
〔2006〕no.11 Steel, electrolytic aluminum, calcium carbide, ferroalloy, coke, automobile (cement, coal, 
electricity, textile). 
〔2007〕no.15 Electricity, steel, building materials, electrolytic aluminum, ferroalloy, calcium carbide, 
coke, coal, flat glass. 
〔2009〕no.38 Steel, cement, flat glass, coal chemical, polysilicon, wind power equipment (electrolytic alu-
minum, shipbuilding, soybean crush). 
〔2010〕no.7 Electricity, coal, steel, cement, non-ferrous metals, coke, paper, leather, printing and dyeing. 
〔2013〕no.41 Steel, cement, electrolytic aluminum, flat glass, ship. 
〔2016〕no.6 Steel. 
〔2016〕no.7 Coal. 
〔2018〕no.80 Steel, electrolytic aluminum, flat glass, coal, cement, shipbuilding, paper, coke, chlor-alkali, 
photovoltaic, wind power, wire and cable, ceramics, pesticides, nitrogen fertilizer. 
PS：The industries in parentheses in 2006 and 2009 were potential overcapacity industries.124 
                                                 
123 Ibid: pp. 6. 
124 All the documents are available at: http://www.gov.cn/zfwj/  
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As can be seen from the above table, China’s overcapacity is not only concentrated in the general 
traditional industrial industry, but also in some strategic emerging industries. Some coal chemical 
industry, wind power equipment manufacturing industry, polysilicon, photovoltaic cells, etc. also 
have a large surplus. For example, the wind power industry has a serious overcapacity from 2012 
to 2013. It is attracted by market demand and stimulates the development of strategic emerging 
industries. The wind power industry also faces serious overcapacity in a period. Wind power equip-
ment capacity utilization in 2012 and 2013 was less than 70%.125 
 
A direct consequence of overcapacity is to exacerbate trade frictions between China and the coun-
tries concerned. Since overcapacity means a lower product prices, it will naturally lead to a decline 
in the price of products exported to other countries. In fact, China has been the biggest target of 
anti-dumping review and sanctions since it joined the WTO in 2001.126 Based on data from the 
World Bank’s Temporary Trade Barrier Database, experts counted the frequency of products that 
China suffered from anti-dumping investigations during this period. The highest is steel, and the 
second highest is steel fittings, which are just the most severe steel products in the overcapacity. 
The number of anti-dumping investigations was 869 and 657, respectively, accounting for 21.6% 
and 16.4% of the total anti-dumping investigations during this period. In other words, the steel 
industry alone constitutes 38% of China’s anti-dumping investigations.127 The most important rea-
son for the anti-dumping investigation is overcapacity. Here I have compiled anti-dumping and 
countervailing investigations against China initiated by the EU for overcapacity since 2016. 
 
 
                                                 
125  China Development Research Foundation Funded Project, 2013 China National Economic Operation 
Comprehensive Report (3) - New Situation and New Countermeasures for China's Current Overcapacity: pp. 3. 
126  Liu Jianjiang, Luo Shuangcheng, Ling Sili(2015), "International Experience and Enlightenment to Resolve 
Overcapacity", Economic Aspects: pp 34. 
127 Yu Yujie, Jin Yang (2018), “The Status Quo, Causes and Countermeasures of Overcapacity”. Journal of Chang'an 
University: pp. 9. 
Page | 45  
 
Anti-dumping and countervailing investigations and punishments on overcapacity initi-
ated by the EU against China since 2016
 
FEB,2016      The European Commission initiated an anti-dumping review of Chinese-made hot rolled coils.128 
 
MAY,2016     The EU initiated a countervailing investigation into the product. 
 
MAY,2016     The European Parliament refused to recognize China’s market economy status and believed that 
China’s steel industry was over-producing and cutting prices.129 
 
JULY,2016     Levying the definitive anti-dumping duty on the registered imports of certain cold-rolled flat 
steel products originating in the People's Republic of China.130 
 
April,2017      Imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, 
on-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People's Republic of China.131 
 
FEB,2018       Imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed 
on imports of certain corrosion resistant steels originating in the People's Republic of China.132 
 
5.1.3 One Belt and Road: Output Excess Capacity 
For China, the strategic destination of BRI has enormous potential for industrial transfer and ca-
pacity absorption. International capacity cooperation is an important part of BRI. In May 2015, the 
                                                 
128 COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/181 of 10 February 2016: 
 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154263.prov.en.L37-2016.pdf  
129  EU lawmakers reject granting China the market economy status: https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-
society/news/eu-lawmakers-reject-granting-china-the-market-economy-status/ 
130  COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/1329 of 29 July 2016: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/august/tradoc_154832.levy.en.L210-2016.pdf  
131  COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2017/649 of 5 April 2017: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017R0649&from=EN  
132  COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2018/186 of 7 February 2018: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/february/tradoc_156600.def.en.L34-2018.pdf  
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State Council of China issued the “Guiding Opinions of the State Council on Promotion of Inter-
national Production Capacity and Equipment Manufacturing Cooperation”,133 pointing out the 
overall task of promoting international capacity and equipment manufacturing cooperation. That 
is, “Developing countries that highly compatible with China’s equipment and production capacity, 
that have a strong aspiration for cooperation therein, and that are of good conditions and basis for 
cooperation therein shall be taken as priority countries, while markets in developed countries shall 
be actively developed, with promotion of work thereof in all areas by drawing upon the experience 
gained on key points, and with gradual extension thereof. The sectors of iron and steel, nonferrous 
metal, building materials, railway, electric power, the chemical industry, the light industry, the tex-
tile industry, the automobile industry, telecommunications, engineering machinery, aerospace, 
shipbuilding and oceanography engineering, etc shall be taken as priority sectors for taxonomic 
implementation and orderly promotion thereof.”134 In particular, the opinion also emphasized the 
need to “On the basis of domestic advantages, launch of foreign production capacity cooperation 
by the iron and steel industry and the nonferrous metal industry shall be promoted. In keeping with 
the structural reform of the iron and steel industry in China, iron and steel production bases of iron 
making, steel making, steel products manufacturing, etc shall be built in priority countries with 
favourable conditions of resources, with a strong matching capacity and with vast market potential 
by means of export of complete sets of equipment, investment, acquisition, project contracting, etc, 
to lead export of iron and steel equipment.”135 Most of the key industries mentioned are China’s 
overcapacity industries. 
 
Countries along BRI136 
Areas Countries Amount 
                                                 
133 China State Council issued (2015) No. 30, “Guiding Opinions of the State Council on Promotion of International 
Production Capacity and Equipment Manufacturing Cooperation”. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Zhang Pengju (2018). “Research on international financial cooperation in the field of “Belt and Road” infrastructure 
construction”, University of International Business and Economics: pp. 32. 
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East Asia and 
Southeast 
Asia 
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar, 
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Brunei, 
Philippines, East Timor, Mongolia 
12 
South Asia 
India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, 
Afghanistan, Maldives, Bhutan 
8 
Central Asia 






Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, Yemen, Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Ku-
wait, Oman, Bahrain, Syria, Palestine, Iran, Af-




Russia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slo-
vakia, Romania, Ukraine, Slovenia, Lithuania, 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Estonia, Lat-
via, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Al-
bania, Moldova, Montenegro 
20 
Total   64 
 
According to the China National Information Centre (2017)137, the total GDP of 64 BRI countries 
at the end of 2016 was about 12 trillion US dollars, accounting for 16.0% of global GDP. The total 
population of these countries is 3.21 billion, accounting for 43.4% of the global population.  From 
the level of per capita GDP, the economic development of many BRI countries behind China, which 
means huge space for industrial transfer. According to data released by the Ministry of Commerce 
of China, China’s imports and exports in the BRI countries totalled 6.3 trillion yuan in 2016; direct 
investment in the BRI countries was 14.5 billion US dollars, accounting for 8.5% of China’s total 
foreign investment,138 which effectively promoted China’s industrial upgrading and overcapacity 
problems are resolved. 
 
                                                 
137 China National Information Center(2017), "One Belt, One Road" Big Data Report (2017). 
138 All data is available at: http://data.mofcom.gov.cn/  
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5.2 One Belt and Road: Strategic Choices to Address Global Climate Change (Case Study: 
Arctic Region) 
 
5.2.1 The Relationship between Climate Change, Energy Security and Geopolitics 
 
Geopolitical logic is concerned with a country with a clear political power, territory and population 
as an actor, rational behaviors and reactions in international affairs or in the face of threats, and the 
interactions between these behaviors and reactions. Therefore, almost all political geo-strategies 
aim to maximize their own state’s interests. From the perspective of geography, geopolitics em-
phasizes the influence of geographical factors on the interrelationship between countries in inter-
national politics.139 Although geography is the most basic factor of national diplomacy, it is not 
eternal, and climate change will affect geographical factors. After the end of the Cold War, the 
pattern of globalization and political multi-polarization has gradually strengthened. As the impact 
of climate change on individual countries has increased and the status of important geostrategic 
regions such as the Middle East, Central Asia and the Arctic has changed, the geostrategies of 
countries have also changed. This influence is reflected in various aspects, including diplomacy 
between countries, scientific research cooperation, economic and trade cooperation, and so on. 
 
Among them, due to the impact of climate change, the world's energy structure and development 
direction have also changed. At present, the industrial revolution based on “green energy” (green 
energy refers to energy that does not emit pollutants) and cutting-edge information technology are 
being formed worldwide. It will profoundly affect the economic production mode, reorganize the 
industrial structure and the competitive landscape, and it will also profoundly change the people’s 
lifestyle and the form of social organization drives a series of changes. 140 Since many traditional 
energy sources cause serious pollution to the environment and even lead to ecosystem degradation, 
various countries have introduced policies to promote environmental protection, rational use of 
resources, and research and development of renewable energy. Green development has become an 
                                                 
139 WANG Wentao, LIU Yanhua, YU Hongyuan(2014), “The geopolitical pattern of global climate change and energy 
security issues”, Acte Geographica Sinica: pp. 1261. 
140 Wang, W. and Y. Liu (2015). "Geopolitics of global climate change and energy security." Chinese Journal of 
Population Resources and Environment 13(2): 3-7. 
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inevitable direction. This kind of development model will promote the transformation of economic 
development models and industrial structure in various countries. Correspondingly, the geopolitical 
pattern and the international competition rules will also undergo great changes. Therefore, actively 
responding to climate change will fundamentally reform the traditional scale expansion model and 
position the international status and image. 
 
China is in the middle of industrialization, which tackling climate change is also an intrinsic de-
mand in China’s development stage. First, while China is over-consuming fossil energy, it emits 
a large amount of carbon dioxide and also emits a large amount of pollutants. Solving the problem 
of environmental pollution has become China’s imminent domestic demand, and the most direct 
livelihood issue cannot be ignored Now China's economic development model and industrial 
structure are facing a critical transition period. China's extensive development model and low 
energy efficiency have become obstacles that restrict and hinder further development. For exam-
ple, in 2012, China’s energy consumption per 10,000 US dollars of GDP was 4.74 tons of standard 
coal, exceeding the world average of 3.65 tons of standard coal, which is 2.5 times that of 1.94 
tons of standard coal in the United States. Four times that of Japan’s 1.15 tons of standard coal. 
141 Also, China’s energy security issues should have long-term plans. In 2012, China’s oil imports 
were dependent on 58% and natural gas imports were 29%. China has switched from a net exporter 
of coal to a net importer, with imports reaching 270 million tons in 2012.142  
 
In the future, the dependence on energy such as oil and natural gas may increase. However, China's 
previous energy transportation channels were not smooth. After the "9.11" incident, uncertainties 
in energy security have increased, factors such as energy production, sea energy transportation, 
energy price instability, and the rise of resource nationalism have become the direct challenges to 
maintaining energy security.143 The continued turmoil in Egypt and other Middle East-North Af-
rican countries in 2011, and the “Arab Spring” spread to countries such as Egypt, Libya, Yemen, 
                                                 
141 World Bank Open Data, http://data.worldbank.org/. 
142 Department of Energy Statistics of National Bureau of Statistics of China (2013). China Statistical Yearbook- 2013. 
Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2014. 
143 Chen Yingchun (2012). “Analysis of the Causes of the "Islamic Arc Belt" Turbulence and the Warning of China's 
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Syria and Bahrain, and the unrest affected the production of major oil and energy producing areas. 
It is the fluctuation of global oil and energy prices. Therefore, under the background of climate 
change, the Chinese government decided to develop new energy transportation channels to solve 
its own energy security problems, and to prepare for the world's new energy technologies and 
market layout. Addressing climate change will be an important issue for the long-term interna-
tional continuation, and it will be related to the future economic, political and energy landscape 
of the world. The Chinese government is considering achieving a dual transformation between 
domestic and international under the climate change, to create new development momentum and 
opportunities in the country, to increase the voice of the international society and to play a greater 
influence in international affairs. 
 
Under the global climate change environment, the geopolitical position of the Arctic has also un-
dergone tremendous changes. In the next section, I will use the Arctic region as an example to 
analyze the strategic intentions of China’s BRI on climate change. 
 
5.2.2 China’s Strategic Intention in the Arctic under Climate Change 
A direct result of climate warming in the Arctic is the opening of the Arctic Ocean channel. In July 
2009, two German cargo ships successfully crossed the northeast route and announced the birth of 
a new commercial route.144 Later, shipping companies in Russia, Norway, Denmark and other 
countries actively tested the Arctic navigation, and the commercial navigation on the Northeast 
Passage increased year by year. In 2010, the number of foreign merchant ships passing through the 
Northeast Passage was 6; in 2011, 34; in 2012, 46.145 In 2013, it grew to 71 ships. In 2013, the 
freight volume of cargo ships transported through the Northeast Passage totaled 1.35 million tons, 
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an increase of 7.5% over 2012.146 The opening of the Arctic Channel will have a major impact on 
the world’s ocean transport pattern and will have a far-reaching strategic effect.147 
 
Once the Arctic route is fully opened, it will provide many opportunities for China’s foreign trade, 
regional economic development, and the growing of the marine economy and the construction of 
a maritime power. For example, China’s use of the Arctic route will greatly shorten the transporta-
tion cycle between China’s eastern coast and Europe and the eastern United States, reduce trans-
portation costs, and directly bring economic benefits to China’s foreign shipping and trade.148 The 
Arctic route will also affect China’s regional economic development pattern. The eastern coastal 
areas of China, especially the northern coastal areas, will bring new opportunities for economic 
development and growth in those areas; the Arctic route will also change China’s external trans-
portation pattern, increase the choice of foreign exchange channels, and further diversify the marine 
transportation routes, which will help reduce the dependence on the Indian Ocean routes, dispersing 
marine transportation safety risks.149 
 
It is noteworthy that after the opening of the Arctic Channel, the Arctic Ocean between Europe, 
Asia and North America will highlight its central role, and its strategic position and value will 
increase significantly. The Arctic route will evolve into an important strategic resource and strate-
gic means. Competition between the relevant countries will be carried out around the control of the 
route. The right to control the Arctic route will become the new geopolitical competition between 
the Arctic countries and the countries concerned. Like traditional canal routes, the Arctic route will 
also be the target of strategic resource allocation for countries that want to control the world or 
compete for world hegemony, creating new geopolitical competition.150 The opening of the Arctic 
                                                 
146  Atle Staalesen(2014), “Putin wants Russian ships on Arctic route”, Barents Observer: http:// 
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Channel will increase the geopolitical influence of the countries along the Arctic Ocean, especially 
those countries whose routes pass through the sea, will gain certain control over the main maritime 
traffic, strengthen their position in the sea, and translate into international affairs. Russia, the United 
States, Canada, Norway, Denmark and other countries have obvious influence on the new route. 
Most of the northeast channel needs to pass through the Russian-controlled sea area. The northwest 
channel needs more to pass through the northern Canadian waters, and the two channels eventually 
Need to pass the Arctic waters controlled by the United States and Russia. On the Arctic route issue, 
China is in an asymmetrical position compared with the Arctic countries, especially the countries 
where the routes are located. China’s role will be mainly for users of the channel, in the opposite 
strategic position with the channel owners and dominators. In the strategic game, the complexity 
and passiveness of China’s ocean strategic decision-making cannot be ignored. 
 
Although China is not an Arctic country, China is clearly not willing to give up its participation in 
the Arctic affairs and deploy geopolitical strategies to gain benefits in the Arctic such as the inter-
national mechanism of the Arctic route. Therefore, Chinese government has begun to put its per-
spective on the northernmost part of the world map, the Arctic region. Since 2012, especially, with 
the growth of China’s economic strength and the improvement of its international status, the Chi-
nese government’s vocalization of the Arctic affairs has become more frequent. In 2013, Chinese 
President Xi Jinping proposed One Belt and Road Initiatives. Some experts put forward the idea 
of incorporating the Northeast passage of the Arctic channel into the maritime Silk Road.151 Since 
the beginning of 2017, President Xi Jinping has met with leaders of Russia, Denmark, Finland, the 
United States, Norway, and Canada to exchange information on Arctic cooperation and bilateral 
relations. When meeting with the Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Anatolyevich Medvedev152, Xi 
Jinping pointed out: China and Russia should jointly carry out the cooperation in Arctic route’s 
development and utilization to create Polar Silk Road.  
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On January 26, 2018, the Chinese government issued a white paper entitled “China’s Arctic Policy” 
(2018)153. In addition to describing China’s interests and intentions in the region, the White Paper 
also highlights China’s important role as a major stakeholder in the Arctic by announcing China 
as a “near-Arctic country”.154 The document also attempts to incorporate the Polar Silk Road into 
One Belt and Road initiative. In terms of bureaucracy, in March 2018 China carried out a large-
scale reorganization of state institutions, including Chinese polar institutions, and the dissolution 
of the State Oceanic Administration. This led the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Authority (CAA) 
to be directly affiliated with the new Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR).155 Regarding the Arc-
tic region, it will be responsible for the development and organization of maritime, deep sea and 
polar strategies. In addition, MNR announced the launch of the Arctic Environmental Satellite and 
Numerical Weather Forecast project in December 2018.156 In addition, the agency announced in 
December last year that it will work with Arctic countries to launch environmental satellite and 
weather forecasting projects. This project allows for clearer data and environmental monitoring 
for vessels traveling in the Arctic. These actions show that China will deepen its influence on the 
Arctic affairs and continue to expand the scale of the Belt and Road route to the Arctic.157The 
Kiruna satellite receiving station in northern Sweden is such a case of cooperation. However, there 
are still some hidden dangers in such cooperation.158 For example, local people will worry that the 
station may transmit military intelligence, so they have already encountered public relations prob-
lems. 
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5.3 One Belt and Road: Response to the Rebalancing toward Asia-Pacific Strategy 
Since the end of the Cold War, especially since China’s accession to the WTO, China has further 
deepened the integration of the US-led international political, economic, and monetary and finan-
cial order, and has become the biggest beneficiary of the US-led international economy and mon-
etary and financial system.159 China’s increasing economic growth and remarkable improvement 
in its international economic status: First, after surpassing Germany to become the world’s third 
largest economy in 2008. Then China overtook Japan in 2010, becoming the second largest econ-
omy in the world after the United States.  
 
In response to the rise of China, the United States has adopted two different strategies: On the one 
hand, it must contact China. In the trade sector, US-China bilateral trade has grown steadily year 
after year, and the opening of the US market has become an important external driver for China’s 
export-oriented economic growth. In the financial sector, the US government has achieved a greater 
degree of entry into the Chinese market by its multinational corporations and financial institutions 
through the China-US Strategic Economic Dialogue. By contrast, the United States is also using 
various means to contain China. In the trade field, as of July 13, 2015, the United States initiated a 
total of 99 anti - dumping lawsuits and 31 anti - subsidy lawsuits against China, accounting for 37% 
of the total number of anti - dumping and countervailing lawsuits in the United States.160 In the 
financial sector, the United States not only oppressed the appreciation of the Renminbi through 
unilateral parliamentary bills, but also applied pressure to China through multilateral occasions 
such as the G20 and the IMF, trying to replicate the successful experience of financial negotiations 
on Japanese currency in the 1980s. In the area of rulemaking, the United States announced in Jan-
uary 2009 and soon led TPP. This strategy to some extent excludes China’s accession and limits 
China's influence in the Asia-Pacific region, thus achieving the strategic goal of balancing China's 
rise.161 In the security field, the United States has implemented a military “Rebalancing toward 
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Asia-Pacific” strategy, which not only strengthens the military presence in East Asia, but also 
closes military alliances or partnerships with East Asian countries. The US-Japan alliance has been 
further consolidated.162 “The US government's China policy has shifted from working with China 
on global issues to explicitly preventing China from challenging international norms.”163 
 
Under such circumstances, China’s strategic development space has been compressed to a large 
extent in East Asia, forcing China to use BRI to find a way out to the northeast, southeast, and west. 
Faced with the north-south and south-east, China and South Korea, New Zealand, Australia, 
ASEAN and its members signed a free trade zone and the latter’s initiative to join the AIIB, helping 
to resolve the US’s strategic pressure on China in the areas of trade, investment, financing and 
monetary finance. At the same time, China is also actively contacting Europe to win their support 
for BRI. China is pursuing its selective standards and policies in many areas and is trying to fully 
test US leadership.164 
 
As a typical trading country, China has succeeded in export-oriented industrialization in the long-
term implementation of the US dollar exchange rate and dependence on exports to the United States, 
but it also faces a systemic dilemma: due to the closed and underdeveloped domestic financial 
market, it is unable to lead international finance, market development direction and rules. Since 
currency is not widely distributed in the world, it must rely on exports to earn foreign exchange 
income. It cannot use foreign exchange for export goods for domestic consumption and can only 
reinvest in the US stock market and bond market. As a financial country, the United States has the 
privilege of the dollar as the sole world currency, despite its current account deficit and debt.  
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This new type of unequal international division of labour has put China at a systemic risk of de-
preciation of the dollar and shrinking of foreign reserves. To this end, China needs to use regional 
economic, monetary and financial cooperation to reduce the risks and costs of the US dollar system. 
Then, in recent years, the two major countries in East Asia, Sino-Japanese relations, have become 
increasingly tense due to territorial disputes. The East Asian regional monetary and financial co-
operation faces major setbacks.165 Therefore, it is necessary to expand the geographical space of 
new regional economic, monetary and financial cooperation. First, promote the internationalization 
of RMB by implementing BRI. The degree of internationalization of BRI countries has increased: 
(1) The types and scale of bond issuance in the offshore RMB market along the route have been 
expanded, covering the UK, Switzerland, Australia, Luxembourg, France, UAE, Malaysia, Korea, 
etc.  (2) The international cooperation of RMB has progressed steadily. First, the role of the RMB 
as a reserve currency is gradually accepted.166 Among the 32 bilateral currency swap agreements 
signed by the People’s Bank of China, 25 BRI countries were involved, and the agreement amount 
reached 2. 25 trillion yuan. Second, the budget for the clearing of the Renminbi has been expanded. 
The financial centres covered include Singapore, London, Frankford, Seoul, Paris, Luxembourg, 
Doha, Sydney, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. Third, the pilot of RMB Qualified Foreign Institu-
tional Investors (RQFII) was steadily rolled out, including the United Kingdom, France, South 
Korea, Germany, Singapore, Australia, Switzerland, Luxembourg and Qatar, with a total amount 
of 550 billion yuan.167 
 
Second, through the implementation of One Belt and Road Initiative to promote monetary and 
financial cooperation between China and the major creditor countries in Asia and Europe. There 
are four main types of Asia-Europe countries radiated in the resurrection of the Bretton Woods 
system with the United States as the central country and the US dollar as the central currency. One 
is the trade-oriented countries represented by East Asian countries. The US exports industrial man-
ufactured goods to obtain US dollars; the second is the energy-based countries represented by the 
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Middle East oil-producing countries, which obtain US dollars by exporting oil to the United States; 
and the third is the commodity-type countries represented by Australia and New Zealand. The US 
exports agricultural products to obtain US dollars; the fourth is the investment countries repre-
sented by the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, which earn US dollars by investing in the 
United States. Under such an international currency pattern, the United States is the world’s largest 
debtor, and the Asian and European countries collectively constitute the international creditor of 
the United States. As creditors, these countries have the same investment preservation or value-
added needs as China. To guard against the risk of the dollar, they are motivated to seek diversifi-
cation of the export market and diversification of investment instruments in China. In fact, these 
countries have signed bilateral currency swap agreements with China, established the offshore cur-
rency centre of China, and piloted RQFII, which proves that the monetary and financial cooperation 
between China and the major creditor countries in Asia and Europe has a realistic basis.168 
 
5.4 Protecting the Overseas Investment Interests of Chinese Companies 
With the rise of China and the deepening of its integration into the global economy, more and more 
Chinese companies are investing in other countries. After 2006, the Chinese government began to 
simplify the examination and approval procedures for foreign investment projects and implemented 
a range of policies to encourage enterprises to invest overseas.169 Affected by this, China’s foreign 
direct investment flows reached 107.84 billion US dollars in 2013, the same growth 22.8 %, ranked 
as the third largest foreign investor in the world for two consecutive years; the stock of foreign 
direct investment (accumulated net amount) reached 6604. 8 billion US dollars, two times ahead 
of the previous year, ranking the 11th in the world.170 Among them, countries and regions along 
road of BRI have become an important destination for China’s foreign direct investment. In terms 
of stocks, China ‘s direct investment in countries and regions along the route of BRI in 2013 was 
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720. 200 million US dollars, accounting for 10 % of China’s total foreign direct investment.171 
From the perspective of traffic, during the period of 2003 - 2013, China’s direct investment in BRI 
countries increased by an average of 51% annually, higher than the growth rate of investment in 
other regions during the same period. This momentum was in 2008. This was especially evident 
after the financial crisis. From the perspective of regional distribution, China has the largest direct 
investment in Southeast Asia and the fastest growth in investment in Central Asia. At the national 
scale, China’s direct investment is mainly concentrated in Singapore, Russia, Indonesia, Kazakh-
stan, Myanmar and Mongolia.172 
 
The BRI countries are almost the most complex geographic regions in the world with the most 
complicated geographical and cultural differences, the most serious ethnic conflicts, the most tur-
bulent state and regional situations, and the most entangled relationship between major powers. 
Here, the overseas investment interests of Chinese companies are highly vulnerable to the war in 
Central Asia, the “Islamic State (IS)” emerging in the West Asia region, the political instability of 
the countries where the investment is located, and the anti-China trend of Chinese countries. There-
fore, China took the opportunity of construction in BRI, conducted economic and trade exchanges 
and political exchanges with BRI countries, and ensured the institutionalization of project cooper-
ation between Chinese enterprises and the local government; through extensive investment in in-
frastructure construction to realize the investment income of Chinese enterprises to benefit the host 
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Chapter 6. Impaction, Problem and Challenges 
 
The geopolitical benefits brought about by geopolitical significance are not all of BRI. It is accom-
panied by high returns, which is a high-risk threat. First of all, BRI is a national interest-oriented 
geopolitical strategy, so it is difficult to achieve the absolute balance between the two countries in 
the process of operation. In this process, a series of incidental adverse consequences can occur. In 
addition, as a global geopolitical strategy, BRI covers different cultural traditions, ideologies, reli-
gious beliefs, ethnic positions, etc., so there are potential geopolitical risks. Geopolitical risks occur 
in the geopolitical interactions of international political actors. The causes of geopolitical risks are 
often the ones issued or executed by international actors, whether they are subjective or objective 
foreign political policies or behaviours that trigger the anxiety, counter-measure or geopolitical 
structure of relevant international political actors. It also includes negative geo-environmental fac-
tors that influence the policy release or implementation of the country in the geopolitical interaction 
process. Next, I will conduct an in-depth analysis of BRI from the adverse effects and potential 
geopolitical risks. 
 
6.1 Adverse effects of One Belt and Road Initiative 
 
6.1.1 Increased debt 
One of the focal points that the Belt and Road strategy has been criticized by the international 
community and public opinion is whether it is exporting debt traps. Although the Chinese govern-
ment has been denying this proposition, the data shows that a weak BRI country is indeed at risk 
of a huge debt crisis. A previous study published by the Centre for Global Development (CGD) 
showed that 23 of the 68 countries that signed an agreement with China on BRI were found to have 
higher debt distress risk.173 Eight of them will significantly increase their risk of falling into sover-
eign debt because of the “funding financing” associated with BRI.174 The research institute FT 
Confidential Research(FTCR) combed the World Bank data and found that the external debt levels 
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of six Southeast Asian countries have been significantly higher than the average level of developing 
countries, which may lead to a serious debt crisis of the six countries, Laos’ foreign debt as a per-
centage of Gross National Income (GNI) is as high as 93.1%, well above the developing average 
of 26%.175 This is followed by 69.6% in Malaysia and 54.4% in Cambodia. The external debt ratio 
of Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand is also significantly higher than the overall average. The rea-
sons behind the author conclude that Laos, like Malaysia, are carrying billions of dollars in related 
debts because of the BRI infrastructure project. For example, the railway from the capital of the 
Lao capital Vientiane to Kunming, China, has a scale of 5.8 billion US dollars, equivalent to 40% 
of the country’s GDP.  
 
The same problem does not exist only in Southeast Asia. According to the report of GDC, 17 
countries in the Middle East and Africa signed the BRI agreement with China, including African 
countries such as Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia and Kenya.176 The report suggests that Djibouti may 
significantly increase its debt risk because of BRI related financing. At the end of 2016, 82% of all 
external debt was against China’s debt.  
 
6.1.2 Low Infrastructure Utilization 
Undertake the debt crisis of the last part, Sri Lanka is also a typical country of this case. Under the 
BRI strategy, China has borrowed loans to develop Hambantota in Sri Lanka. As a result, Sri Lanka 
officially leased the strategic port built by China to China for use in the form of a 99-year lease in 
December 2017.177 But the deeper reasons for its debt crisis are the low utilization of these infra-
structure projects.  
 
In order to build the first phase of the port, Sri Lanka borrowed US$307 million from China with 
a commercial interest of 6.3% per annum. Analysts at CSIS (Centre for Strategic and International 
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Studies)’s Jonathan Hillman and Ship Technology’s Eva Gray pointed out that the commercial in-
terest rates on these loans are relatively high.178 Analysts believe that China’s high interest rate 
clause reflects the lack of competitive bidding. The lack of competitive bidding is because other 
entities do not believe that it is economically feasible to provide loans to the Sri Lankan government 
to build a port in Hambantota. The port of Hambantota performed poorly after opening in 2010. In 
the first two years, there were no large ships docked at the port due to large rocks on the seabed. In 
order to clear the stone, the Sri Lankan government had to borrow another 40 million dollars from 
the Chinese government. Finally, even after the port was fully opened in 2012, almost no ships 
arrived. For example, in 2012, it is estimated that 34 of the 50-60,000 vessels passing through the 
southern tip of Sri Lanka are actually docked at the port of Hambantota. By 2016, the business was 
so low that the port’s annual profit was only $1.81 million. With the increase in operating costs and 
the scarcity of revenue at the port, the Sri Lankan government was forced to convert debts to Chi-
nese companies by the end of 2017.179 
 
The low utilization rate of some infrastructure projects and the inability to obtain effective returns 
on investment costs exacerbate the debt risk of the host country. However, on the one hand, the 
research before the project is inadequate, and the leaders are persistent, on the other hand, because 
the project is opaque, not open, and lacks consultation, many local residents do not understand the 
actual situation of the project. How to improve the transparency of the Belt and Road construction 
is an important issue to promote its long-term development. This effectively reflects the great dif-
ficulty of China’s large-scale implementation of infrastructure projects in an unfamiliar political 
and economic environment. Therefore, China should disclose the economic data of the project, 
loan conditions, and conduct effective risk, feasibility and sustainability assessments for all pro-
jects. 
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6.1.3 Low Transparency of Projects and Human Rights Issues 
The international community’s controversy over One Belt and Road Initiative stems from the opac-
ity of many of these projects. Transparency International, a global monitoring agency based in 
Berlin, published a survey in 2016 that reflected Chinese companies to be the lowest transparent 
in the world.180 Transparency International evaluates the performance of multinational companies 
in emerging markets in combating corruption and business transparency based on a survey of 100 
companies in 15 emerging markets. The survey used a 10-point scale, with 0 being the lowest 
transparent and 10 being the most transparent. The Chinese companies that accounted for 1/3 of 
the companies surveyed had the worst overall performance.181 The three companies rated as 0 were 
all from China. And not just Chinese companies, this low level of transparency is reflected in all 
aspects of Chinese society. 
 
There are large number of foreign websites that cannot be accessed normally in mainland China, 
like the world's largest search engine Google, social platforms Facebook, Instagram and Twitter, 
financial network Bloomberg, video network YouTube, New York Times, radio BBC Chinese Net, 
as well as the British Financial Times, the US Wall Street Journal and so on, covering political, 
economic, cultural, postal, photo, video, cloud storage types of websites, etc. And until now, the 
Chinese government has not given a clear explanation why it is necessary to block these websites. 
Even in China’s domestic social networking sites like Weibo, information about politically sensi-
tive information is subject to network control, prohibiting users from commenting on forwarding，
or simply not being able to search for relevant content. In modern life, the Internet has largely 
changed the way people communicate and pass information. It also enables more people to partic-
ipate in grassroots economic and socio-political discussions and public citizenship.182 However, as 
far as China is concerned, the Internet will, to a certain extent, give people the opportunity to ques-
tion the authority and management of the government, thus reducing the authority of state control 
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and opening up various aspects of social and political issues for debate.183 This may be the reason 
for the opacity of the Chinese network. 
 
This opacity also exists in some aspects of BRI. Due to the lack of transparency in BRI project 
process, it is difficult for foreign companies to participate in the BRI project in the early stage. The 
two sides often have disputes due to fairness and reciprocity issues. Unclear project standard issues, 
procurement bidding processes, and investment risks have added more obstacles to the entry of 
foreign companies. In addition, the problem of low transparency in this operational process also 
provides conditions for the generation of corruption.  
 
According to Transparency International, many BRI countries have become the most corrupt coun-
tries in the world.184 Leaders in various countries say that they are promoting economic develop-
ment, but they are also swearing through kickbacks and secret trading. In fact, the “Belt and Road 
Initiative” has triggered many cases of corruption. In Kyrgyzstan, there were problems with the 
construction of power plants in China, and two former prime ministers were accused of receiving 
kickbacks from Chinese construction companies and both were arrested.185 In Malaysia, the funds 
provided by the Export-Import Bank of China were misappropriated by a company associated with 
former Prime Minister Najib Razak, which led to the cessation of two large pipeline projects related 
to BRI. 186 
 
The lack of transparency in BRI projects is not addressed, and it will be difficult for other countries 
to look at this initiative with a positive view. Lack of transparency can not only fuel corruption, but 
also exacerbate the debt crisis in developing countries, and it will also exacerbate people’s doubts. 
Similarly, the Digital Silk Road, as an integral part of the BRI, is also seen as a channel for China’s 
                                                 
183  Wang, X., Juffermans, K., & Du, C. (2016). Harmony as language policy in China: An Internet 
perspective. Language Policy, 15(3): https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10993-015-9374-y 
184 CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2018: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 
185 Catherine Putz (2018), “Kyrgyzstan Hunt for Power Plant Corruption Continues”, The Diplomat: 
https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/kyrgyzstan-hunt-for-power-plant-corruption-continues / 
186 Stefania Palma (2018), “Malaysia cancels China-backed pipeline projects”, Financial Times:  
https://www.ft.com/content/06a71510-b24a-11e8-99ca-68cf89602132 
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export surveillance technology. This includes the use of facial recognition software in Zimba-
bwe,187 using a social credit-like management system in Venezuela,188 introducing cyberspace se-
curity laws for Uganda and Tanzania, and using the Great Wall Firewall in Russia.189 This move 
also raises questions about human rights violations. 
 
6.2 Risk 
BRI strategy accelerates the closeness of the East Asian geostrategic jurisdiction and also expands 
the scope of the jurisdiction, which is based on the rise of China’s national strength to become the 
world’s second. However, compared with the US and the EU as well as other developed countries 
in the world, China’s per capita GDP is seriously insufficient, and the overall strength is strong, but 
the development is seriously unbalanced. China’s manufacturing is still in the transition period 
created for China. The decline of demographic dividends and the deterioration of environmental 
resources are the core issues that constrain China’s strategic resource allocation. Therefore, how to 
use strategic resources more rationally in this case is an important proposition. “Either the ‘strategic 
military’ or the ‘strategic economy’ has a major internal balance. Simply put, one of the biggest 
problems of China’s foreign policy is what is the strategic focus? Once the excess is wasted in areas 
with limited strategic value. Resources will bear huge losses for China. China’s strength is not 
enough to support China’s security protection for investment BRI areas. 
 
At the same time, it should be noted that the core of China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy is 
economic cooperation, not military strength. Therefore, if the “One Belt, One Road” strategy is to 
seek the pursuit of power or the vacuum of power in Eurasia, it is not easy. As the two geopolitical 
countries of the traditional Eurasia, the United States and Russia have formed a dynamic balance 
between the geopolitical game and the local interest groups. The promotion of China’s BRI strategy 
                                                 
187  Lynsey Chutel (2018), “China is exporting facial recognition software to Africa, expanding its vast 
database”:https://qz.com/africa/1287675/china-is-exporting-facial-recognition-to-africa-ensuring-ai-dominance-
through-diversity/ 
188 Angus Berwick (2018), “How ZTE helps Venezuela create China-style social control”:  
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/venezuela-zte/  
189  Shayera Dark(2018), “Strict new internet laws in Tanzania are driving bloggers and content creators 
offline”:https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/6/17536686/tanzania-internet-laws-censorship-uganda-social-media-tax 
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is difficult to undermine the original equilibrium system, because the implementation of China’s 
One Belt and Road strategy depends to a certain extent on the stable environment of the original 
structure. Therefore, the promotion of China’s BRI strategy must be based on the joint promotion 
of multiple entities, with the aim of optimizing the geopolitical environment along the BRI road, 
using economic cooperation and interconnection as a means, and choosing partnerships with lim-
ited support. Countries with better geo-environmental conditions and better strategic conditions 
will gradually promote the maturity and movement of East Asian geostrategic jurisdictions with 
soft power (soft power is relative to the gross domestic product such as GDP and urban infrastruc-
ture.190 It refers to the factors that influence the development potential and appeal of a country’s 
culture, values, and social systems191) in a phased manner. Here, China must do a good job in 
assessing and predicting the geopolitical risks of BRI countries, which promote the multi-govern-














                                                 
190 Zhang Wei (2017). “Geo-strategy research on China's “Belt and Road” construction”. Jilin University: pp. 50. 
191 Zhao Wei (2018). “Research on the improvement of Chinese cultural soft power under the “Belt and Road” strategy”. 
Lanzhou University of Technology: pp.32. 





China’s Belt and Road Initiative, combined with the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road”, is China’s guiding geostrategy for decades to come. This strategy 
emphasizes coordinated development policies, financial cooperation, strengthening investment and 
trade relations, building infrastructure networks and deepening social and cultural exchanges. The 
Belt and Road Initiative involves a large number of countries, a vast territory, and complex eco-
nomic, political and cultural backgrounds. This complexity requires detailed risk-benefit analysis, 
which has been absent from academic and political fields to date. For many scholars, the Belt and 
Road Initiative is an attempt by China to challenge and re-plan existing global political and eco-
nomic structures that can create new growth opportunities for other developing countries and cities 
that participate in numerous projects. On the other hand, we see potential financial and even polit-
ical risks in participating cities and countries, which may cause damage to the project if not dis-
cussed. 
 
In my thesis, I first analyse the difference between the geographical origins of China and the West 
from the perspective of geopolitical theory, which provide evidence for China’s Belt and Road in 
terms of historical background. Then, by expounding the status quo of the Belt and Road, we in-
troduce the geopolitical intentions that China wants to build through this strategy. In the end, I will 
summarize the advantages and disadvantages of the countries involved in One Belt and Road Ini-
tiative, which conclude BRI is not a so-called altruistic policy. In the process of participation, it 
will also face corresponding risks. Need to be vigilant and weigh. I also analysed the risks and 
losses that China may face in this strategy to conduct a comprehensive anatomy of the strategy. I 
hope that the data and policies in the One Belt One Road policy will provide a more open and 
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